# Artificial Intelligence, global competition and the future of our industry

## A survey of global semiconductor executives



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# Forward

Integrated Insights and GSA connected with over 130 semiconductor industry leaders from the US, Europe, Mainland China, Taiwan, and other regions to understand their perspectives on the long-term trajectory of our industry. The results highlight an optimistic industry that is laser-focused on “winning” artificial intelligence, while expressing deep concern about the negative impact of geopolitics.

While different companies will take different approaches to these twin trends, nearly all respondents indicate that they can no longer perform “business as usual” - they will need strategic transformation for continued success.

This publication is designed for semiconductor CEOs, COOs, CFOs, CTOs, global sales leaders as well as strategic and corporate development executives. It is equally relevant for executives of companies whose products rely on semiconductor components, including telecommunications infrastructure, cloud services, data centers, artificial intelligence platform providers, devices, and automotive electronics.

# Moving fast and slow: AI, geopolitics and the strategic conundrum

## An optimistic industry dealing with increasingly active governments

Our findings showcase our industry's remarkable sense of optimism, driven by robust growth and stable margins. Meeting the demand for artificial intelligence (AI) solutions remains paramount, with companies re-tooling their investments and "picking up the pace" to keep abreast of the rapidly changing market. Respondents, especially in Asia, believe that hardware — specifically the GPUs and CPUs fueling the AI boom — represents the most attractive segment in the AI technology stack. Respondents from the US and Taiwan are most optimistic about their region's competitiveness in these booming markets.

At the same time, respondents across all regions see an increasing impact from government policies. A substantial minority believes that government policies and funding (not the market) will drive the semiconductor industry going forward. While most respondents view their home government policies positively, the increased focus from policymakers results in geopolitical challenges. Respondents view US-China technology competition, which is driving the emergence of distinct US-centric and Chinese-centric supply chains, as the most significant threat to the semiconductor industry.

**4 OUT OF 5** indicate margins in their segment will be stable or higher over the next 5 years

**40%+** believe hardware players will be long-term winners in AI

**44%** believe government policies, not markets, will drive semiconductor industry strategy

**2 OUT OF 3** indicate geopolitics is the biggest threat to our industry

## Consolidation and competitiveness: American optimism and mixed views on China

AI and geopolitics are shifting the industry's "balance of power." Respondents expect AI to concentrate power in leading countries while enabling new companies in those countries to flourish. This "consolidation" tendency extends to the regional R&D and manufacturing footprint. Despite the semiconductor aspirations of regions such as the Middle East, Southeast Asia, India and others, respondents overwhelmingly believe that the incumbent regions with highest global market share (Japan, Korea, Mainland China, Taiwan, and the US) will "win" on talent, capital, and innovation breakthroughs, while expanding their market share lead in semiconductor manufacturing.

**4 OUT OF 5**

indicate customers prioritize performance and price over geopolitical risk in choosing suppliers

This consolidating force aligns with industry key buying factors – customers care far more about product performance and cost than supply chain geopolitical risk. Our industry, which demonstrates first mover, scale and clustering benefits, favors incumbency. New regional entrants must build their investment case on innovation and cost effectiveness, rather than their "geopolitical advantages."

Despite 80% of respondents working for Asian, European or Middle Eastern companies, executives express substantial optimism towards the United States. Respondents from every region rank the US as the country most likely to create breakthrough innovation, attract global talents, and win global capital investment.

**75%** believe the USA will attract the world's best technical talent

While viewing Taiwan and Mainland China as better locations for manufacturing semiconductor innovations, respondents expect the US to gain the most leading-edge manufacturing market share. Finally, the group anticipates end customers across all regions, including the "Global South", to align more with the American technology ecosystem than the Chinese one.

Respondents expect the Chinese-centric semiconductor supply chain to have the greatest success in the automotive market. There are diverging perspectives on the future global reach of the China-centric semiconductor supply chain - an equal number of respondents support the notion of an "in China for China" supply chain and a "Chinese supply chain that competes globally."

## The corporate playbook: our response to the dueling trends of AI and geopolitics

Companies will take three actions to win in this emerging environment.

Firstly, they will laser focus on innovation. Creating new technologies and driving new business models will be higher priorities than responding to geopolitics, reducing costs, or even integrating AI into operations.

Secondly, acknowledging the inadequacy of their current AI strategies, most companies will ditch “business as usual”, pursue new partnerships, move into new business domains and “move faster” to catch the opportunities.

Thirdly, companies will consciously navigate the bifurcated semiconductor landscape. Many companies are choosing to concentrate resources on just one of the two global semiconductor supply chains, while others are establishing separate legal entities to serve both. They will also update their global footprint via investing in new manufacturing and R&D locations, and seeking new investors, suppliers and customers.

**BY A 3:1** margin, companies will prioritize investing in innovation over geopolitical moves like supply chain de-risking

**1 OUT OF 4** companies plan to split up into separate legal entities to continue serving the US and Chinese markets



## These dueling transformations create a conundrum. Strategy is about making choices, and the trade-offs between the demands of AI competition and winning the geopolitical game are clear.

Winning in AI drives the need to move faster, to expand global partnerships, and to invest more in innovation. De-risking global operations requires adjusting to the pace of policy making, investing in duplicative manufacturing capabilities and suppliers, breaking up R&D teams, shrinking the set of global partners and, for some companies, shuffling a wide mix of assets, teams, IP and customer relationships between two distinct legal entities.

**80%+** believe they need to change their corporate strategy to win in AI

**2 OUT OF 3** companies do not yet have detailed execution plans for supply chain de-risking

Executives will also need to avoid a debilitating "blind spot" evident in the survey data. Universally, respondents rate their own region's capabilities more highly than respondents from other regions – in other words, there is a consistent "home court" bias that could skew decision-making.

Given all the above, leaders are unlikely to be able to perfectly optimize both AI and geopolitical strategies – something will have to give. In addition, leaders will make these trade-offs in an environment of long-term uncertainty. More than 60% of respondents believe supply chain stability is more than five years away.

These challenges may explain why more than 70% of companies in our survey have not yet started executing their new global strategy.

In our industry where execution is paramount for survival, CEOs and leaders that approach this confounding set of challenges with agility, insights, patience, and humility, will be in a much better position than those who cannot.

# The demographics of our survey

### Demographics of respondents by region

The 130 respondents work across all major regions and represent a diverse group of companies with headquarters scattered around the world. More than 30% of respondents work in a region different than the headquarters location. Over 60% of respondents work in Asia, with Mainland China representing the largest regional cohort.




### Demographics of respondents by company role in the supply chain

Approximately 1/3 of the 130 respondents work for companies that sell products to end customers (fabless companies and IDMs) while the majority provide products or services to other semiconductor companies (chemicals, design services, EDA tools, equipment, foundry services, packaging and testing services, etc.).






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# Our optimistic industry

Our industry exudes positive sentiment, as we expect both top-line growth and bottom-line health. Despite regional differences in product and end-market focus, there is a consensus that the “current big thing”, Artificial Intelligence, will remain the “next big thing.”

**3 OUT OF 4**

pick GPUs and CPUs as the most attractive industry segment

**90%**

believe our industry will grow faster than global GDP

**1 OUT OF 2**

believe commercially viable quantum computing is more than 10 years away

# Bigger, more profitable and driven by AI

9 out of 10 respondents anticipate semiconductor growth rates will outpace global economic growth over the next 5 years. One-quarter predict industry growth will surpass global economic growth by more than 4 percentage points. 75% forecast their segment margins to stay flat or rise during the next five years.

Greater than half of respondents choose AI as the most attractive end market and indicate that GPUs, CPUs and AI accelerators are the most attractive product segment. Chips that support the AI rollout (connectivity, power management and memory) bunch together closely as the next most attractive segments. Perhaps reflecting overcapacity concerns, respondents grade mature logic as the least attractive segment.

**How rapidly will global semiconductor industry revenue grow in the next 5 years?**




**How will profit margin in your industry segment change over the next 5 years?**




**Semiconductor end markets ranked by attractiveness (1 being most attractive)**




**Product segments ranked by attractiveness (1 being most attractive)**



# AI chip optimism in the East, software optimism in the West

Globally, a slightly higher percentage of respondents believe that hardware components, such as GPUs and CPUs, will be the biggest beneficiaries of the AI boom compared to software companies.

Respondents based in Mainland China are the least optimistic about software companies benefiting from the AI boom. In contrast, American and European respondents believe that, collectively, enterprise or AI-focused software developers will benefit more than chip providers. Less than 10% of respondents believe users of AI will be the biggest beneficiaries.

Half of our respondents doubt that quantum or all-optical computing will be viable within 10 years or “ever”. Respondents working for American companies are almost twice as optimistic about the viability of quantum computing as their peers working for Mainland Chinese companies.

**Which companies will benefit most from artificial intelligence over the next 5 years?**




**When will next-generation fully optical or quantum computing architectures be commercially and technologically viable?**



# AI confidence for US and Taiwan respondents, while Mainland China respondents pin hopes on automotive and packaging

Respondents working in Mainland China are most enthusiastic about local companies' share gains in the automotive end market, and in the assembly, packaging, and testing industry segment. Those working in the US are most optimistic about the AI end market, and the fabless design and EDA industry segments. Taiwan respondents believe companies there will continue to gain share in wafer manufacturing and lead in the AI segment. Despite PCs, phones and mobile devices continuing to be the largest single segment for semiconductors, there is little optimism in Europe or US that local companies will gain more share in the segment.

**Companies from your region will gain the most global market share over next five years in ...**

**... which end market?**




**... which industry segment?**






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# Our “love-hate” relationship with government policies

We welcome government policy actions when they help us attract capital or talent, but have little appetite for actions that interfere with market and supply chain access. Despite the increasing impact of geopolitics, success in our industry continues to be driven by traditional factors of product, performance and price.

**2 OUT OF 3**

indicate that local government policies are positive for the industry

**1 OUT OF 3**

request governments to provide more subsidies, while a similar number request government to “get out of the way”

**Customers of Taiwan based respondents are**

**3X**

more likely to prioritize “absolute product performance” than customers of Mainland China respondents

# We hate geopolitics, but we “like” policies of our local government

More than half of the respondents perceive geopolitics as the primary threat to the industry. At the same time, 2/3 of respondents believe that their local governments' policies are positive for the industry.

Respondents show less concern for the entry of system or hyperscaler companies into the semiconductor industry or the potential for product commoditization.

Respondents have diverse expectations of government policies, with 1/3 prioritizing government financial support, 1/3 favoring deregulation, and only 10% requesting government to help improve global market access.

Respondents from European and Taiwan-based respondents express the greatest concerns about talent, while US and Mainland China respondents are most likely to request the government reduce its influence.

**Please rank the severity of threats to the semiconductor industry over the next 10 years (1 being most threatening)**




**Are government policies in your region positive or negative for the industry?**




**What is the #1 action the government could take to help your region’s semiconductor industry?**



# At the company level, performance and price are still king

Geopolitical risk is not the most important driver of procurement decisions. More than three-quarters of respondents indicate that product attributes drive customers’ purchasing decisions. Customers of Mainland China and Taiwan-based companies are more likely to prioritize relative price-performance than customers of European or American companies.

Geopolitical concerns are not omnipresent in corporate decision-making. Only 2 out of 5 respondents believe government policies will impact half or more of major corporate decisions, while 1 out of 4 believe government policies will have minimal impact.

**When your customers choose products or services, which of these is the most important?**




**In the region where you do most of your business, geopolitical concerns will change**



# At the industry level, there are stark regional differences regarding the relative influence of the government versus the market

Respondents are split on the relative influence of government and the market, both in setting industry direction and in funding industry capital requirements. 56% indicate that market forces will drive industry strategy, with 53% indicating that private investors will drive industry capital investment.

Different regions reflect different views on the relative roles of government versus the market. Mainland China respondents see a more important role for government policies and funding, whereas US and Taiwan-based respondents indicate a stronger belief in the central role of private investors and markets.

**Will the government or the markets drive industry strategy and investment going forward?**

**Views across all global respondents**




**Views between regional respondents**



# The greater the policy bias towards local players, the more local players support government policy

A majority of respondents believe that government policy is biased towards local semiconductor companies. Respondents in Mainland China and Taiwan report the most “local bias” and are also the most satisfied with their government’s policies. European respondents indicate the least bias towards local companies as well as the least satisfaction with government policy.

**More favorable views towards government policy correspond to more preferential treatment of local companies**




There is a perception gap regarding the relative support that the Chinese government gives to local companies. 4 out of 5 respondents that work in Mainland China for non-Chinese companies perceive a large policy bias towards local companies, while only half of the respondents work for local Chinese companies hold the same perspective. This perception gap is not observed elsewhere.

**In the region where you work, do government policies support local or foreign firms more ?**



# Our views on technology competition between nations

We expect the emergence of a bifurcated global semiconductor supply chain. While global respondents are more optimistic about and investing more in the US-aligned supply chain, they see Mainland China's strength in manufacturing and scaling new technologies. Companies have diverse revenue exposure to the China-centric semiconductor supply chain and have diverging expectations regarding the future of that supply chain.

**72%**

believe that both US and Mainland China will continue to erect barriers to technology collaboration going forward

**4 OUT OF 5**

believe the semiconductor supply chain will bifurcate between US and China-centric spheres

**84%**

of Mainland China respondents select the United States as the most attractive location for talent

**70%**

believe European companies will primarily use American-sourced technology, while 52% believe the Middle East will use equal amounts of American and Chinese technology

# A bifurcating semiconductor industry

Most respondents expect the US and Chinese governments to reduce collaboration opportunities and market access to companies from the other country. 35% of respondents working for mainland Chinese companies believe China will improve market access, while only 15% of respondents working for US companies share the same perspective.

**Which of these is the most likely outcome of US-China technology competition in 5 years?**




A large majority of respondents anticipate the global technology industry will split into two separate supply chains to serve the respective US and Mainland Chinese markets, with the stability of these two supply chains to be 5 or more years in the future.

**What will be the most likely regional structure of the global tech industry in 5-10 years?**




**How long will it take for the two "mostly separate" US and Chinese supply chains to evolve and stabilize?**



# Optimism in the competitiveness of the US semiconductor industry

Respondents consider the US to be a more attractive location than any other region for global capital, global talent, and creating breakthrough innovation. In all three categories, respondents select the USA five times more often than select Mainland China.

**In your specific industry segment, which region will be most successful over the next five years at ...**




Respondents have disparate views on which regions will gain share in leading-edge semiconductor manufacturing. They are most optimistic about the US's ability to gain share and least optimistic about Europe. However, there was high variance in responses, with all major regions except Europe lying within the standard error ranges.

**How many points of share of global leading-edge semiconductor manufacturing capacity will a region gain OR lose over the next ten years?**



# Optimism in global alignment to the US technology ecosystem

Respondents expect regions to align with either the US technology ecosystem or the Chinese ecosystem, rather than developing a separate, localized technology stack.

Across all regions, respondents expect the US technology ecosystem to be more successful than the Chinese, especially in European nations and India.

Respondents expect the Middle East to split their support between the US and Chinese technology ecosystems.

Respondents from the US and Mainland China had substantially similar views on the ecosystem alignment decisions of these global regions. US respondents are more optimistic that Europe will align with the US technology ecosystem. Mainland China respondents are more optimistic about the success of the American technology ecosystem in the regions colloquially known as the "Global South" (India, Latin America, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East).

**Which situation best reflects how each region's technology industry will develop in the next 10 years**



# Consensus and divergence on Chinese semiconductors

When looking specifically at the potential success of the Chinese semiconductor industry, respondents expect Chinese companies to be most successful in the automotive, electrification, and devices segments. Less than 1 in 5 indicate that AI will be one of the two most successful segments for the Chinese-centric supply chain.

1 out of 3 respondents believe Chinese companies will operate primarily as "local" businesses within Mainland China, another one-third see opportunities for these companies in low-cost global markets, while the remainder envision Chinese companies competing globally across both leading-edge and mature technology segments.

Non-Chinese companies continue to have substantial revenue exposure to the Chinese market. Over 60% of the respondents believe that they will lose more than 15% of their top-line revenue if they can no longer serve the Chinese-centric technology industry.

**In which two end markets will the "Chinese-centric semiconductor supply chain" gain the most global market share?**




**What will be the global role of Mainland Chinese semiconductor companies in five years?**




**What percentage of global sales could your company lose by not serving (or being legally unable to serve) the Chinese-centric technology supply chain?**



# “Rise of the rest” delayed or denied? AI expected to consolidate regional power

Respondents indicate that the same regions that control nearly 90% of the global semiconductor manufacturing today — USA, Taiwan, Korea, Japan, and Mainland China — will “win” the next decade by gaining global manufacturing share, attracting talent and capital, and leading in creating and scaling innovations.

90% of respondents believe AI will concentrate industry power in the currently technologically dominant nations, with 7 out of 10 indicating that the rise of AI will create opportunities for new companies in those countries.

**Perspective on regional competitiveness across all categories, comparing current top 5 manufacturing regions versus “rest of world”**




**How will AI change the distribution of power between companies and countries globally?**



# Our diverging views and the “home court” bias

**Fabless companies are**

## 2-5X

more likely than upstream industry suppliers to select Mainland China as the #1 location for innovation and capital investment

**Upstream suppliers select the US**

## 6X

more often than Mainland China as the most attractive location for talent

**Across every region except the US, respondents are**

## 2 TO 10X

more likely to select their own region as the #1 global location for capital investment

# Diverging perspectives on the relative strengths of the US and Mainland China

### Perspectives on the US versus Mainland China as a destination for global capital

American, European, and Taiwan-based respondents are more optimistic about the US being the top destination for global capital compared to Mainland China. No respondents based in Taiwan, Europe or other Asian regions selected Mainland China as the top global destination.




### Perspectives on the relative innovation capabilities of the US and Mainland China

Fabless respondents are the most optimistic towards Mainland China as both a source and manufacturer of innovation, while upstream supply chain respondents are the least optimistic.



# Diverse views on the relative capabilities of Mainland China & Taiwan

Fabless respondents prefer Mainland China to Taiwan as the location to scale innovation, while IDMs and upstream supply chain roles rate Taiwan higher.

US respondents equally rate Mainland China and Taiwan as top locations for manufacturing and scaling innovation, while Europeans and Taiwan-based respondents are twice as likely to select Taiwan as the top location.

## Perspectives on Mainland China versus Taiwan as the #1 location for manufacturing and scaling innovation

### Summary of views from different industry roles




### Summary of views from different regions



# Respondents across all regions demonstrate a "home court" bias

Respondents across all regions are consistently more optimistic than others about the prospects of their own region. When asked to rate the attractiveness of different regions for global capital investment, respondents in Europe were 5x more likely to choose Europe, while respondents in Mainland China were 2x more likely to choose Mainland China. In selecting which regions will gain leading edge manufacturing share, respondents in the US and Taiwan indicate 1.5x greater share gains for their own regions versus other respondents.

We observe less bias when respondents evaluate regional attractiveness for global talent. Across all regions, more than 2/3 of respondents selected the US as the #1 destination for leading technical talent.

**“Home court” view: estimating gains in semiconductor manufacturing market share**




Points of share gains in leading edge manufacturing

**“Home court” view : selecting the #1 region for global capital investment**




Respondents across all regions demonstrate a “home court" bias

1Middle East and Southeast Asia results are not statistically significant

# Our playbook: strategic moves & priorities

Companies will need to balance between innovating to “win AI” and de-risking for supply chain resilience and global market access.

**4 OUT OF 5**

companies believe their current strategy is not sufficient to win in AI

**By a**

**10:1**

margin, non-Chinese companies will focus on the US-centric supply chain over the China-centric supply chain

**70%+**

of companies that are de-risking their supply chain do not yet have a tactical execution plan for doing so

Mainland Chinese companies are the most likely to split up their business into separate legal entities for market access or supply chain resilience

# The AI race is driving investment and innovation on multiple vectors

Respondents do not believe their current strategies are adequate for the AI era, and propose various new efforts and investments across product, development and business development functions. The need to "do more to win in AI" drives an overall strategic focus on investing and innovation, far outweighing the priority given to geopolitical responses or operational improvements.

**To "win in AI", our company needs to ...**




**"Do more to win in AI" requires us to ...**




**Driving respondents to overwhelmingly choose product and business model innovation as the #1 strategic priority ...**



# Companies are making calls on market priorities in a bifurcating industry

**In response to a bifurcating global semiconductor market, our company will....**




In building a strategy to ensure market access under geopolitical pressure, nearly 40% of respondents plan to concentrate their resources on the US-centric supply chain. Another 25% intend to split their resources equally between the US and Chinese supply chains, with a smaller number of respondents planning to prioritize their efforts on the China-centric supply chain.

Headquarters location impacts market priorities. Roughly half of Chinese companies plan to focus their resources on the China-centric market; while less than 2% of non-Chinese companies share that same priority. US, European and Taiwanese respondents indicate similar market priorities, with roughly half indicating they will prioritize the US-centric supply chain, and the remainder splitting their focus or their legal structure to compete in both the US-centric and the China-centric market.

Fabless companies are most likely to split into separate legal entities to serve both markets, while IDMs plan to distribute resources equally between the US and China under one unified company. By a 4-to-1 ratio, upstream suppliers serving semiconductor companies will focus on the US market versus the China market.

# Companies are making moves to ensure supply chain resilience

Just over one-quarter of companies plan to split their supply chains entirely between US and Mainland Chinese markets; while 1 in 5 companies are not taking any measures to de-risk their supply chain.

The remainder will take specific measures to de-risk their supply chain without fully splitting themselves up. Mainland Chinese companies will be most likely to change manufacturing locations and to add more Chinese suppliers, while European and US companies are most likely to remove at-risk sources of IP and R&D from their roadmaps. US and Taiwan-based companies are adding more US-based suppliers, while Europeans are adding suppliers from both regions.

**At the highest level, what is your supply chain resilience/ de-risking strategy?**




**If you are not "fully splitting up" your supply chain, what specific steps are you taking?**



# Cost reductions are not a top priority despite AI investment, supply chain realignment and increased Chinese competition

In addition to investments in AI capabilities, a large majority of respondents expect building supply chain resilience will decrease margins, either via higher costs or lower revenue. In addition, more than 2/3 of respondents expect Chinese semiconductor companies, with their price-for-performance focus, to compete globally.

Despite these trends that collectively will create pressure on margins, only 5% of respondents select cost reduction as their top strategic priority.

Will this be an additional “blind spot” that executives later regret?

**Selected results that indicate future pressure on industry margins**

**82%**

expect to invest more to “win in AI”

**68%**

expect Chinese companies to compete globally

**83%**

expect building supply chain resilience to incur incremental costs or reduce revenues

**7 OUT OF 10**

Chinese semiconductor companies prioritize price-for-performance in their product offerings

**What is your #1 strategic priority?**



# Final thoughts

Facing the twin challenges of AI and geopolitics, dozens of governments and thousands of companies will shift their strategies over the next decade.

These moves will lead to industry instability, as current playbooks for innovation, business models, partnerships and government affairs become outdated. Scenario planning, policy analysis, strategic nimbleness, operational flexibility and a cost reduction mentality will become more and more important.

Companies that enhance these capabilities without dropping the ball on “making great products” will be the long-term winners through this dynamic decade.



# About Integrated Insights and the GSA

## Integrated Insights Ltd.

Integrated Insights is an advisory firm serving Chairpersons, CEOs and Boards of global technology companies. The firm partners with leaders to build robust strategies that fully comprehend the collision of industry, technology and geopolitical trends, helping them make the “hard calls” required during times of disruption.

The firm’s team has decades of hands-on experience and insights into the Asian and Chinese markets, computing technologies, global policy trends, and the semiconductor investment environment.

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GSA is *Where Leaders Meet* to establish an efficient, profitable and sustainable high technology global ecosystem encompassing semiconductors, software, solutions, systems and services.

A leading industry organization that represents 300+ corporate members, including more than 120 public companies, GSA provides a unique, neutral platform for collaboration, where global executives interface and innovate with peers, partners, and customers to accelerate industry growth and maximize return on invested and intellectual capital. Members of the GSA represent 75 percent of the $575B+ semiconductor industry and continue to grow.

For more information visit
www.gsaglobal.org

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Chris formerly was a partner and leader of the Asia Semiconductor Practice at McKinsey & Company. He also spent a decade at Intel Corporation, where he led the China business, as well as acting as general manager of several business units at the company’s Silicon Valley headquarters.

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**Eric YJ Chiu** has dedicated over 15 years to working in various fields of technology risk and governance across EMEA and North America. Currently, his research at Integrated Insights is primarily focused on semiconductor supply-chain risks and AI safety.

He co-founded and led FisherITS, a London-based advisory and software business specializing in supplier risks, third-party governance, and IP protection for more than a decade. He also serves as a committee member for the British Standards Institute and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO).



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